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In this paper a unique dataset of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks
during “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland (NI) is analysed via a Hawkes process
model. It is found that this past dependent model is a good fit to IED attacks
yielding key insights about the nature of terrorism in NI. We also present a novel
approach to quantitatively investigate some of the sociological theory surrounding
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) which challenges previously held
assumptions concerning changes seen in the organisation. Finally we extend our
use of the Hawkes process model by considering a multidimensional version which
permits both self and mutual-excitations. This allows us to test how the PIRA
responded to past IED attacks on different geographical scales from which we
find evidence for the autonomy of the organisation over the six counties of NI
and Belfast. By incorporating a second dataset concerning British Security Force
(BSF) interventions, the multidimensional model allows us to test counter-terrorism
(CT) operations in NI where we find subsequent increases in violence.
1 Introduction
Terrorism is a major international concern which shows little signs of abating.
There is therefore great importance in developing scientific approaches to under-
stand the behavioural underpinnings of terrorism in order to prevent and disrupt
these activities. The ability to gain such insights through real world experimen-
tation is questionable due to the risks associated with unsuccessful approaches.
One of the cheapest and most adaptable methods of research in this area is
mathematical modelling [33]. Such modelling provides not only a vast number
of well-developed tools and techniques but also the opportunity to experiment
freely without unnecessary safety risks or ethical concerns.
Several advances have been made in this field of late, leading to a vari-
ety of conclusions with policy making implications. Braithwaite and Johnson [7]
studied the interactions of insurgent attacks and Coalition counter-insurgency op-
erations in Iraq. The authors were able to conclude from space-time patterns
that indiscriminate counter-insurgency operations resulted in a backlash effect by
insurgents whilst discriminate operations had the opposite effect. Along similar
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lines Lewis et al. [29] apply self-exciting point process models to study violent
civilian deaths in Iraq during the U.S.-led invasion. They found a two to six
month timescale for violent deaths which correspond to a series of related at-
tacks. Hence, quick interventions could help to drastically lower the problem of
violent deaths in Iraq. In a similar spirit a study by Mohler [35] found evidence
that terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland followed a pattern of self-excitation
lasting 9.3 weeks. The line of investigation taken by these sorts of studies have
important consequences for tackling the types of terrorism seen in NI where in-
surgency and civilian deaths were major issues [20]. These approaches marked a
large departure from political science-inspired methodologies that generally linked
the quantity of terrorist attacks to “root causes” like socio-economic indicators
that are quasi-static and fail to provide insight into the triggers needed for a
strategic intervention.
The methods employed in these terrorism studies [7, 20, 29, 35] along with
several others [14, 22, 55] share similarities with the modelling of spatio-temporal
phenomena in crime pattern theory [8]. In that context it is assumed that crim-
inal activity forms a series of quantifiable patterns at the macro scale [16, 44].
Mathematical descriptions of these patterns, or more generally ‘crime hotspots’,
can be explored and exploited in real-time. By targeting susceptible areas with
preventative measures there is potential for great reductions in subsequent crime.
This approach has since been shown to be effective in a number of real-world
applications including policy [2, 17, 31], and predictive policing [6, 27].
It is from this point of view that we aim to approach the issue of terror-
ism during the conflict in NI. In this paper we seek to add to the literature
concerning spatio-temporal patterns of terrorism by studying a unique dataset
of IED attacks in NI between 1970-1998. Specifically for the case of NI this
paper is focused on the group known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA). Although there are extensive historical accounts and a growing body of
social science research related to this group [3, 19, 25, 26, 51] there is a gap
for a wider scope of mathematical investigations of their activities.
The PIRA was predominantly formed from members of the Catholic commu-
nity in NI [56] and saw itself as “the legal representatives of the Irish people,
[who] are morally justified in carrying out a campaign of resistance against for-
eign occupation forces and domestic collaborators” [39]. The active period of the
PIRA between 1969-1998 can be traced out in five phases [3]. These phases and
their historical context are described below.
• 1969-1976 - Phase 1: During this phase the organisation was arranged in a
military style having brigades, battalions and companies.
• 1977-1980 - Phase 2: A cell-based structure was adopted. This approach was
characterised by PIRA fracturing into small groups of members known as Ac-
tive Service Units (ASUs) [25]. This approach aimed to improve the organisa-
tion’s secrecy by making it harder to infiltrate.
• 1981-1989 - Phase 3: The Republican campaign moved into the political arena
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militant wing, PIRA.
• 1990-1994 - Phase 4: Secret meetings involving top ranking PIRA leaders
negotiating a ceasefire with the British Government.
• 1995-1998 - Phase 5: Peace talks announced with a ceasefire ratified in the
Good Friday Agreement signalling for many the end of “The Troubles”.
During its active phases the PIRA successfully developed a large arsenal of
IEDs which it employed with devastating effects for both the security forces and
civilians [53]. In particular, the impact of violence was felt heavily by the civil-
ian population which constituted approximately 54% of all deaths [20]. Moreover,
the deaths caused by the NI conflict were highly concentrated in Belfast, where
approximately 47% of fatalities occurred [20].
In analogy to the studies of Braithwaite and Johnson [7], Lewis et al. [29] and
Mohler [35] we make an attempt to understand the driving forces behind IED
attacks in NI. Our extension to the present literature revolves around the access
we have to a unique dataset of IED events which allows us to study a specific
type of terrorist activity in great detail at a fine temporal scale. The dataset we
use provides ample evidence for any past dependence on insurgent attacks and
this study attempts to understand these dynamics in greater detail. The model
chosen to explore this question is a Hawkes self-exciting point process. It makes
use of a response function (or kernel) which holds information pertaining to the
long-term influence of previous events and has been shown to well represent a
number of past dependent processes including gang related violence [18, 24, 52],
email exchanges to infer organisation leadership [21], burglary [34, 50] and violent
deaths in conflicts as previously mentioned [29]. It also provides an opportunity
to examine each of the five phases of PIRA activity separately, as is done in
Model 1 and all subsequent models, offering direct quantitative insights into how
the group behaved and reacted through the stages of the Republican campaign.
As well as studying temporal patterns of insurgency Lewis et al. [29] also
compare Hawkes processes in different regions of Iraq to understand spatial in-
fluences seen during waves of violent attacks. Similarly in this paper we un-
dertake spatial disaggregation of PIRA attacks according to the six counties of
NI and we also separate Belfast due to its significance during “The Troubles”
as discussed above [20]. This additional spatial information is to yield insights
about the extent to which PIRA units in NI acted autonomously as suggested
by Horgan and Taylor [25]. This latter study forms the theoretical basis for
Models 2 and 3.
The PIRA did not act in isolation however, and in this contribution, we
also aim to explore the interplay between PIRA and the British Security Forces
(BSF) by employing a multidimensional Hawkes process. Previous studies into
British counter-terrorism (CT) strategies in NI [12, 28, 40] found evidence that
the actions of BSFs could undermine the effort to curb Republican terrorism
and even result in a negative backlash increasing the number of attacks. For
instance, in 1988 an operation by BSFs resulted in the deaths of three PIRA
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members in Gibraltar. An analysis of subsequent PIRA attacks found positive
increases related to the incident 36 months after it occurred [28]. The inclusion
of additional mutually exciting terms in the Hawkes process has been seen to
represent other interacting systems in the past including multiple gang networks
[50], but, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be applied to yield insights
into CT strategies.
To test the CT strategies employed in NI two types of events will be assessed
in this paper. Firstly, from the discussion above concerning the background of
the PIRA it was pointed out the organisation drew the majority of its volun-
teers from the Catholic community [56]. Consequently deaths of Catholic civilians
resulting from BSF operations may be expected to prompt a significant retalia-
tion from the PIRA. We investigate this effect in Model 4. Moreover, following
the case study findings of Lafree, Dugan and Korte [28], as discussed above, the
backlash effect of BSF actions which killed PIRA members will be considered
in Model 5. With such insights we aim to uncover a useful methodology by
which CT practitioners and academics can judge the efficacy of past strategies
to combat terrorism.
Alongside the contributions this paper aims to make concerning the use of
the Hawkes process we also present a novel approach to deal with the issue we
refer to as edge effects. This effect is the result of events outside the observa-
tion period influencing those inside [46]. Whereas in previous studies using the
Hawkes process the data analysed is in a single time series [18, 29] with the
segmentation of our data according to the five phases of PIRA it is possible
that events in previous phases may have influenced those in future ones. As a
consequence of this a moving time window approach was considered whereby the
data points from adjacent phases were combined to find the quantitatively best
fitting model.
The structure of presentation will be in 6 sections. In Section 2 a discussion
of the datasets used for this paper will be provided. Then in Section 3 the
mathematical models that have been studied will be introduced in more detail.
This section will also contain further information about the method used to ob-
tain model parameters. Next in Section 4 the numerical results of the paper will
be provided. This will begin with a description of the novel approach we have
taken to examining edge effects in the data analysed. Alongside the results a
discussion will be provided about how the model parameters can be interpreted.
Finally in Section 5 the findings of the paper will be discussed with their po-
tential impacts for both the academic community and practitioners demonstrated
as well as a brief overview of future research topics.
2 Data
This paper utilises a unique dataset of PIRA IED events from 1970 to 1998.
This dataset was collected through an exhaustive coding of newspaper reports
and other open source outlets. Please see Asal et al. [3] for a full outline of
the data collection and verification process. In total, the dataset spans 5461 IED
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Field Values
Date Year (1970-1998)/Month (1-12)/Day (1-31)
Location {Antrim, Armagh, Belfast, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, Tyrone}
Target {Political, Military, Police, Paramilitary,
Government, Transport, Civilian, Foreign}
Table 2. BSF Dataset Event Fields
Field Values
Date Year (1970-1976)/Month (1-12)/Day (1-31)
Religion {Catholic, Protestant}
Status {Civilian, British Security, Republican Paramilitary,
Loyalist Paramilitary, Irish Security}
Organisation Responsible {British Security, Republican Paramilitary,
Loyalist Paramilitary, Irish Security, Unknown}
Geographical Location {Belfast North/East/South/West,
County Antrim/Armagh/Derry/Down/Fermanagh/Tyrone,
Derry, Britain, Europe, Republic of Ireland}
events. For each event there are numerous details concerning the IED attack and
groups involved. Details of the event fields relevant to our study are given in
Table 1. It should be noted here that when discussing BSFs we refer to both
military and police targets. For further details on all the information contained
in the dataset the reader is referred to Asal et al. [3].
Alongside the study of PIRA related attacks in isolation, an additional inves-
tigation was made into how BSF attacks impacted upon further PIRA attacks.
The dataset concerning BSF attacks was obtained from the Conflict Archive on
the Internet (CAIN) [53]. In Table 2 the event fields and possible values for
this dataset are presented. In this study only the events which occurred in NI
were considered. There were a total of 131 Catholic civilian deaths recorded in
the final dataset of BSF events. Of these entries 78 were found to correspond
to Phase 1 of PIRA activity. This lead to a only a small number of data
points being available in the other phases with 12, 34 and 7 points for Phases
2, 3 and 4 respectively and 0 for Phase 5. Due to this distribution of data,
results were only obtainable for Phase 1. The number of PIRA IED events in
Phase 1 targeting BSFs was 144. See Sections 4.8 and 4.9 for further details.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Poisson Process
The first model studied serves as a baseline to compare with the Hawkes process
[18]. The specific baseline model tested was a Poisson process model specified
via a single parameter N/T, where N = number of events and T = time of the
final event measured from time 0 [47]. The Poisson process assumes that each
event is independent and thus that the system has no memory of attacks in
the past.
3.2 Univariate Model
Moving to a more complex model this paper will consider the influence of self-
excitations of PIRA IED attacks. The method we used is based on studying
an intensity function which describes the rate of IED incidents as a function of
time and conditional on the past history of events. The intensity function takes
the following form [23] for a given set of event times {ti}Ni=1.
λ(t) = µ+ k0
∑
t>ti
g(t− ti;ω) (3.2)
The response function g is taken to be of the form g(t) = ωe−ωt. The expo-
nential form for the response function is routinely used in studies of crime and
insurgency data [18, 29, 52]. It makes good intuitive sense for events which are
clustered in time and allows for a physical interpretation of each component of
the intensity function. In the example of IED attacks the constant µ can be
considered as a background rate at which IED events occur. After an initial
IED attack there may be further attacks, for example, a PIRA unit may wish
to follow up on the success of a previous attack, and the constant k0 captures
the jump in the IED event rate. However, an indefinitely higher rate is unre-
alistic and eventually the rate will return to the background rate. The rate of
decay is controlled by the term ω. The additional ω preceding the exponential
term acts as a normalisation constant so that the jump factor multiplied by the
response function can be viewed as the number of offspring after an event and
the density of the time interval for the increase in activity [46].
Parameter estimation for the intensity function can be undertaken via the
method of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) [42]. This process involves find-
ing the parameters which maximise the following log-likelihood function derived
by Rubin [48]:
log L({ti};µ, k0,ω) =
N∑
i=1
log(λ(ti))−
∫ T
0
λ(t) dt,
where tN = T will be taken as the final time of observation in a similar ap-
proach taken by Ozaki [42]. For the form of the intensity function given in
7(3.2) the log-likelihood becomes
log L =
N∑
i=1
log
µ+ k0 ∑
ti>tj
ωe−ω(ti−tj)
+ k0 (e−ω(T−ti) − 1)
− µT.
A number of assumptions are built into this formulation. First, all parame-
ters used in the intensity function should be positive [29] to ensure the model
remains realistic. Second, the set of points {ti}Ni=1 should be measured from
time zero. However, since the Hawkes process depends on the infinite past, this
assumption is not achievable in a real world setting and it may be difficult
to eradicate the influence of events outside the observation period on those in-
side [46]. More details on how this problem was handled for this paper will be
discussed in Section 4.1.
A further assumption is that the set of times should be unique [30]. Our
dataset contains several simultaneous events and thus to satisfy the requirement
for uniqueness, events in the same county, or multiple events in Belfast, on the
same day were regarded as a single event. However, to avoid losing too much
detail, events in different counties, or events inside and outside of Belfast, on
the same day were distinguished via the addition of a random timestamp (as
in Bowsher [5]). This is justified by looking at the command and functional
structure of the PIRA which reveals that at the county and Belfast levels IED
attacks were fairly autonomous [25].
Finally, a restraint on the response function g ensures that the model is non-
explosive (see Varadhan [54] for further details concerning explosive stochastic
processes). This assumes that the integral of g over t should be strictly less
than unity [42]. Our choice of g satisfies this condition.
3.3 Multidimensional Model
After examining the past dependent nature of IED attacks based on self-excitations
the second type of model investigated will also include mutual-excitations. For
example, such models will be used to consider the influence of PIRA attacks
and BSF attacks on further PIRA attacks.
The multidimensional Hawkes process model can be defined in a similar way
as was done for the one-dimensional case. Here, with two adversaries, we require
a two-dimensional model. Now there are two sets of event times which will
be labelled {ta}Na=1 and {tb}Mb=1 and two counting processes, Nr(t), r ∈ {1, 2},
which form a two-dimensional counting process N(t). Each individual process has
intensity function defined by [23]
λr(t) = µr + k0
∑
t>ta
g(t− ta;ω) + s0
∑
t>tb
h(t− tb;ν), (3.3)
where the two response functions are defined by g(t) = ωe−ωt and h(t) = νe−νt.
The form chosen for the response functions is chosen by analogy to the research
of Short et al. [50]. In particular, in extending the work of Egesdal et al. [18],
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to study interactions between multiple gangs, results were obtained indicating
that exponential response functions may prove useful to study mutual-excitations
between gangs.
Similar to the univariate case described in Section 3.2 we can interpret the
model in a real world setting. In the case of modelling influences on PIRA
attacks one could, for example, take event times {ta} to represent times of
PIRA IED attacks and times {tb} as BSF attacks. The background rate µr,
jump rate k0 and response function g have the same interpretation as that given
in the one-dimensional case. Similarly the parameter s0 represents the jump in
IED attacks following a mutual-excitation, such as, retaliation against a BSF
attack whilst ν controls the temporal scale over which this mutual-excitation
persists. The parameter ν also acts as a normalisation constant for the response
function h so that the product of the jump factor s0 and the response function
h can be interpreted as the number of offspring events and the density for
the increase in activity following a mutually exciting incident [46]. In this two-
dimensional system the second intensity function would model the influence of
past BSF and PIRA IED attacks on BSF attacks.
To compute parameter estimates the MLE can again be employed. This MLE
takes the following form [50]
log L({ta};µ,k0,ω,s0,ν) =
N∑
a=1
log(λ1(ta))−
∫ T
0
λ1(t) dt,
where, T = max{maxa{ta},maxb{tb}}. A similar formula holds for λ2(t) and {tb}.
As in the one-dimensional case, all parameters must be positive [23] to make
the model realistic and events in the infinite past should be considered [46].
Likewise, event times must be unique [30]. The condition necessary for the model
to be non-explosive is reformulated in the higher dimensional case. In particular,
consider the 2x2 matrix G whose entries are formed of the integrals∫ ∞
0
grs(t) dt, r, s ∈ {1, 2},
for each response function occurring in the definitions of λr. Then the condition
for the model to be non-explosive is that the spectral radius defined as
ρ = max
i
{|ei|} < 1,
where ei represent the eigenvalues of G [9]. Again this assumption has been
checked and found to be satisfied for the models studied in this paper with
the exception of Model 5 (see Table 3 below) which has a spectral radius of
1.0124. This case should therefore be treated with care and may be the result
of a small dataset for this model (see the model analysis in Section 4.9 for
further details).
9Table 3. Models
Model Number Event Times Interpreted Dataset
0 Number of {ti} = IED events in NI PIRA Events
1 {ti} = IED events in NI PIRA Events
2 {ti} = IED events in Belfast PIRA Events
3 {ta} = IED events in Belfast PIRA Events
{tb} = IED events in the six counties of NI PIRA Events
4 {ta} = IED events targeting BSFs in NI PIRA Events
{tb} = BSF events which killed Catholic civilians BSF Events
5 {ta} = IED events targeting BSFs in NI PIRA Events
{tb} = BSF events which killed PIRA members BSF Events
3.4 Table of Models
Having given the general form of the models in this paper the specific models
that were studied are summarised in Table 3. In particular, this table presents
an interpretation of the event times used in each model. For clarity the datasets
being studied in each model are also listed corresponding to the information
in Tables 1 and 2. Times ti correspond to the univariate model presented in
Section 3.2 whilst times ta and tb correspond to the multidimensional model
from Section 3.3. In Section 4, where the numerical results of this paper are
provided, the order of presentation will correspond to the ordering of models
shown in Table 3.
3.5 Computational Methodology
Finding the parameters which maximise the log-likelihoods can be undertaken in
numerous ways [42]. For this paper optimisation of the log-likelihood functions
were undertaken in the Python programming language using the SciPy Optimize
package Nelder-Mead [37, 49]. The Nelder-Mead algorithm was chosen based on
previous observations of its effectiveness when applied to point process models
[45] and also its performance during preliminary coding. It should be noted at
this point that this optimisation procedure finds the minimum value, hence the
equivalent problem of finding the minimising parameters of − log L was consid-
ered. To obtain further computational efficiency a recursive algorithm described
by Liniger [30] was used to compute values of the intensity function.
Another important point, which is made by Egesdal et al. [18], is that due
to the nonlinear nature of the minimisation it is not guaranteed that a global
minimum will be found. Therefore, there is a need to begin the optimisation
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procedure at multiple points and take the parameters yielding the lowest value
of − log L and subject to the conditions given earlier.
Having derived each model’s parameters we then go on to assess its goodness
of fit. To determine the overall model fit residual analysis was employed. The
basic ideas of this approach can be found in Brown et al. [10] and are also
summarised below.
Consider a point process formed of the set of event times {ti} with intensity
function λ. Perform the following integrals which transform the set {ti} to the
set {τi}
τi =
∫ ti
0
λ(t) dt.
If the model is a good fit then the residuals {τi} are independent and dis-
tributed according to a stationary Poisson process with unit rate [43]. Therefore,
the inter-arrival times given by
Yk = τk − τk−1
are exponentially distributed. Setting τ0 = 0 [10] and applying these procedures
for the intensity function given in (3.2) the following formula is obtained
Y1 = µt1,
Yk = µ(tk − tk−1)− k0
k−1∑
i=1
e−ω(tk−ti) − e−ω(tk−1−ti), 1 < k ≤ N.
If the inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed then
Uk = 1− e−Yk (3.5)
form a set of independent uniform random variables over [0, 1). Therefore, to
test the goodness of fit of the Hawkes process it remains to determine if the
corresponding Uk do indeed come from a uniform distribution.
A quantitative test that can be used to check this assumption on the distri-
bution of the Uk values is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test [32]. The KS
test in this case works by comparing the value of the test statistic Dn =
maxk
(|Uk − k−1N |, | kN −Uk|) [57] to a critical value Dα (see O’Connor and Kleyner
[41] for a table of critical values). Statistical significance is obtained if the con-
dition Dn < Dα is found to hold in which case there is evidence to suggest
goodness of fit of the model.
Another method we used, which compares the fit of different models, is the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [1]:
AIC = 2k − 2 log L,
where, k is the number of parameters being fitted in the model and log L is
the maximum of the log-likelihood function. The model yielding the lowest value
for AIC is deemed the better fit: more parameters are penalised whilst a greater
value for the log-likelihood is rewarded. Burnham and Anderson [11] point out
the AIC difference is not a significance test in the sense of critical values and
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requires some judgement. For general guidance Burnham and Anderson [11] sug-
gest that 0 − 2 shows little difference between models, 4 − 7 considerably more
evidence for a difference and > 10 is classified as a significant difference. It is
important that the AIC should only be used to compare models which are fitted
with the same dataset [11], as was done for the comparisons in this paper.
4 Numerical Results
4.1 Determining Phase Boundaries
Initially we will be focused on PIRA IED attacks across all of the counties of
NI and Belfast. Each phase of the events as outlined in Asal et al. [3] will
be explored separately to offer a quantitative description of the changes in the
Republican campaign.
The phases may not be treated in isolation, however. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2, the historical dependence of the Hawkes process means that events
outside of the observation period may influence those inside leading to spurious
parameter values [46]. Thus, Phase 1 may influence events in Phase 2, Phase 2
may influence Phase 3 and so on. To avoid this edge effects issue, a systematic
approach is required to deal with the phase boundaries.
We propose a novel approach to examine the impact of edge effects (see
also Nichols and Schoenberg [38] for another similar approach in the field of
seismology). Specifically, a moving time window was used to include the influence
of events from Phase i in Phase i + 1 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. This method is best
illustrated via example. Consider Phases 1 and 2. First, we calculated the MLE
parameters that result from the dataset consisting of Phase 2 only. Then adding
one point from Phase 1 the MLE parameters were recalculated. This was then
repeated with two points from Phase 1 and so on until the MLE parameters
for all the data in Phases 1 and 2 combined had been calculated. Finally we
determined which of these models provided the best fit compared to the others
using the KS test. It was decided that a more positive difference ∆ = Dα −
Dn gives more certainty that statistical significance has been reached. Thus the
choice of the best fitting model, and hence the most sensible phase boundaries
to use, was decided based on maximising ∆.
Since Phase 1 was effectively the start of the conflict, and the beginning of
the PIRA as an organisation, we do not assume there will be any substantial
effects from previous events outside the dataset. Therefore, the boundaries for
Phase 1 were unchanged from their original definition as in Asal et al. [3].
In Table 4 the number of points that were required to maximise the difference
between the critical value and KS test statistic are given for the remaining four
phases. It can be seen that very few points were required to fix the correct
mathematical boundaries for Phases 2 and 3 and it was found that with so
few points there was little change in the parameter values compared to the
unadjusted phases. However, in Phase 4 it was necessary to include 65% of
data points from Phase 3 which significantly changed the parameter values from
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Table 4. Edge Effects Results
Phase Number of Data Points Added New Boundary
1 - 27/01/1970
2 11 24/10/1976
3 11 22/08/1980
4 494 11/4/1984
5 41 22/5/1994
those found for the original Phase 4 boundary. This is illustrated clearly by the
plots in Figure 1 which show the variation in the values of ∆ and the three
model parameters as each data point is added from Phase 3 to Phase 4. A
similar observation was also made for the case of edge effects in Phase 5.
The boundaries found from this edge effects analyses will be used throughout
the remainder of this paper. This ensures consistency and enables comparisons
between models. From here on in reference to a model’s MLE parameters means
the parameters found using the boundaries stated in Table 4.
4.2 Comparing Models
4.3 Table of Results
For brevity, all model results are listed concurrently for each phase in Tables
5 to 7, but care should be taken when making a comparison of the different
models. A comparison may be made within each of the three investigations:
PIRA events across NI, PIRA events in Belfast and outside, PIRA and BSF
events in NI, but not directly between them, except for model fit. See Section
3.5 for more detail.
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Figure 1. Figure (a) shows the values of ∆ = Dα − Dn for each point added from
Phase 3 to Phase 4. Figures (b)-(d) show the corresponding changes in the MLE
parameter values.
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Table 5. PIRA events across NI.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Model 0 µ 0.3020 0.2541 0.2250 0.3028 0.0957
AIC 3359.6 1784.4 3834.3 5190.5 1079.7
Model 1 µ 0.0543 0.1721 0.0800 0.0597 0.0270
k0 0.8241 0.3233 0.6529 0.8040 0.7231
ω 0.0542 0.7685 0.0426 0.0316 0.0901
KS Test 0.0686 0.0528* 0.0465* 0.0343* 0.0455*
KS Critical 95% 0.0492 0.0701 0.0490 0.0396 0.1072
KS Critical 99% 0.0590 - - - -
AIC 3083.7 1717.6 3750.5 5004 987
* Significant at 95% level.
Table 6. PIRA events in Belfast and outside.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Model 2 µ 0.0375 0.0397 0.0222 0.0175 0.0178
k0 0.7364 0.6456 0.7123 0.8766 0.5925
ω 0.0246 0.0298 0.0135 0.0103 0.0874
KS Test 0.0715* 0.0996* 0.0477* 0.0679** 0.0693*
KS Critical 95% 0.0726 0.1096 0.0878 0.0640 0.1626
KS Critical 99% - - - 0.0767 -
AIC 2015.1 967 1724.8 2707.8 556
Model 3 µ 0.0396 0.0299 0.0189 0.0099 0.0131
k0 0.6441 0.5783 0.7126 0.7449 0.3842
ω 0.0272 0.0339 0.0135 0.0138 0.1001
s0 0.0647 0.0949 0.0208 0.1085 0.2336
ν 0.7840 0.3976 1.1336 0.1099 0.1681
KS Test 0.0561* 0.0961* 0.0667* 0.0562* 0.1745**
KS Critical 95% 0.0726 0.1096 0.0878 0.0640 0.1626
KS Critical 99% - - - - 0.1948
AIC 2013.6 973 1726.1 2716.4 552.3
* Significant at 95% level. ** Significant at 99% level.
4.4 Model 0
For this model we look at just a Poisson process applied to IED attacks across
NI. Even this simple framework manages to capture a difference in rate across
the five phases, showing Phase 4 as having the highest probability of a ran-
dom event in a given time window with µ = 0.3028. This is in contrast to the
Hawkes process in Model 1 where Phase 2 is found to have the highest back-
ground rate whilst µ is much lower in Phase 4, suggesting that events in Phase
4 were heavily dependent on the past. Historical dependence is also seen for the
other phases since the background parameter values found for Model 1 are all
significantly lower than those of the Poisson process in Model 0. According to
the AIC comparisons Model 1 is also shown to provide a better model fit in
each phase.
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Table 7. PIRA and BSF events in NI.
Phase 1
Model 4 µ 0.0189
k0 0.1138
ω 0.9716
s0 1.0694
ν 0.0137
KS Test 0.1122*
KS Critical 95% 0.1133
KS Critical 99% -
AIC 1057.8
Model 5 µ 0.0212
k0 0.2411
ω 0.2757
s0 0.9774
ν 0.0087
KS Test 0.1205**
KS Critical 95% 0.1133
KS Critical 99% 0.1358
AIC 1070.4
* Significant at 95% level. ** Significant at 99% level.
4.5 Model 1
The next model studied was a Hawkes process with a single self-exciting term
applied to IED events across NI.
4.5.1 Goodness of Fit
Qualitative evidence for the model’s ability to represent the data is gained from
visualisation of the intensity function. In Figure 2 a plot of the intensity func-
tion over time for the Hawkes process in Phase 1 is presented. Here the peaks
and troughs of the model are seen to follow closely the patterns of event times
observed in the actual data.
The overall goodness of fit of Model 1 in each phase is determined via the KS
test results. The critical values for the 95% confidence level have Dα =
1.36√
N
[41].
For Phase 1 it was found that the KS test statistic exceeded the critical value
even when considering the 99% confidence level with Dα =
1.63√
N
[41]. Hence there
is insufficient evidence in this case to conclude that the model is accurately
capturing the dynamics of the data.
Although the KS test results for Phase 1 gave a negative result for the
model fit there is some evidence for goodness of fit in a KS plot. Following the
method outlined in Brown et al. [10] Uk, as defined in (3.5), is plotted against
the hypothesized cumulative distribution, evaluated at k−0.5N . If Uk is indeed
uniformly distributed, the resulting graph should be a 45◦ line. The results of
performing this procedure are shown in Figure 3 for Model 1 in each phase
of the PIRA. Upper and lower bounds are also shown, obtained by plotting
the lines y = x ± Dα [13]. In cases where points do deviate from the best fit
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Figure 2. Top graphs show event times of IED attacks and the intensity function for
Model 1 in Phase 1. The bottom graphs are the same but only for the first 500
days.
line they still remain within or close to the error bounds, suggesting that the
Hawkes process generally represents the data well.
A final test is to inspect a plot of Uk+1 against Uk to ensure that the Uk
are independent [4]. If serial correlation occurs it is most likely to be between
adjacent time intervals, hence if these plots reveal some patterning it suggests
that the transformed times are not independent. The graphs in Figure 4 present
this analysis for each phase of the IED data. Although there is some patterning
occurring in the plots for Phases 1 and 4 overall these plots appear to show
little correlation between the neighbouring points of the sequence {Uk}. This
serves as reassurance that independence exists and the Hawkes process is a good
representation of IED attacks.
An AIC comparison to the simple Poisson process in Model 0 shows that
Model 1 provides a better fit in each phase.
4.5.2 Interpreting Parameters
The parameter ω−1 gives information concerning the average length of time a
series of attacks persists. In Phase 1 the average attack window is 10.0542 = 18.5
days. The rate of decay then has a large increase in Phase 2 yielding an av-
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 3. Figures (a) - (e) show KS plots for Hawkes process Model 1 in Phases 1-5
respectively. Data points falling on the solid goodness of fit line imply a perfect model
fit with the dashed lines representing 95% error bounds.
erage time window of 1.3 days. The work of Asal et al. [3] points out that
in Phase 1 there was a more militaristic style of operation within the PIRA
which could suggest better attack coordination allowing for longer periods of re-
lated waves of attacks. However, this organisational structure made the PIRA
susceptible to infiltration by Security Forces thus prompting a shift to a cellular
based approach in Phase 2 [3]. One of the consequences of infiltration could
be reflected in the shorter attack window, which might be representing the fact
18 S. Tench et al.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 4. Figures (a) - (e) show serial correlation plots for Hawkes process Model 1
in Phases 1-5 respectively. A random dispersion of data points indicates goodness of
fit of the model.
that many PIRA members were imprisoned [19], thus, there would have been
fewer members to carry out attacks. In Phase 3 the attack window becomes
23.5 days. This phase saw a resurgence of violence by the PIRA with Moloney
[36] describing the 1980’s as a period of escalating violence similar to the “Tet
Offensive” launched by the People’s Army of Vietnam in 1968. In particular, the
decay rate found could represent the PIRA using sustained attacks to weaken
British resolve to remain in NI. This also links to the PIRA objectives de-
scribed in the organisation’s Green Book [39]. One of these objectives was to
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use a “bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy’s financial interests in our
country unprofitable”. Another objective was to wage a “war of attrition against
enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as
possible so as to create a demand from their people at home for their with-
drawal”.
Phases 4 and 5 then show an increasing trend for the decay rate. In Phase
4 the average time window for attacks is 31.6 days and in Phase 5 it is
11.1 days. These periods were characterised by secret meetings and negotiations
that eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement [3]. The PIRA used IED
attacks as a bargaining tool with the British Government [3] and as noted by
Coogan [15] PIRA had the ability to “turn ... bombing[s] on and off like a
tap”. So these shortening periods of IED usage may have been the PIRA using
its capabilities as a way to achieve leverage with the British Government during
peace negotiations rather than for a war of attrition.
The parameter µ can be interpreted as the background rate at which new
events randomly occurred. The trend appears to be for the parameter to increase
from Phase 1 to 2 and then fall in the remaining three phases. The rise in
Phase 2 may be related to the fact that the organisation of PIRA was shifting
and hence with less control members were conducting attacks more randomly.
However, as the “Tet Offensive” campaign began in Phase 3 attacks became
more systematic. Finally de-escalation of violence over Phases 4 and 5 explain
the decreases in the value of µ.
The final parameter k0 can be interpreted as the jump in the rate of events
following an initial event. Phase 1 has the highest value for this parameter. This
could again be a result of the military structure of the PIRA leading to more
flexibility to escalate events. As before the drop in Phase 2 may be related
to imprisonment of PIRA members hindering the extent to which attacks could
occur. The rise in Phase 3 may also be interpreted as PIRA adopting a “Tet
Offensive” approach and the Green Book objectives both explained above. The
final phases have relatively high values of k0. This can be linked to the PIRA
using IED attacks to demonstrate its capabilities during peace negotiations also
as described above.
4.6 Model 2
The work of Fay, Morrissey and Smyth [20] demonstrates that violence during
“The Troubles” was highly concentrated in Belfast. Thus in Model 2 we refine
the geographical scale of investigation to this region considering a single term
self-exciting Hawkes process applied to PIRA IED events.
4.6.1 Goodness of Fit
The results in Table 6 show that there is strong quantitative evidence for Model
2 providing a good fit to the data. The KS plot for the model in Phase 2 is
shown in Figure 5(a). It was not felt that the data stayed close enough to the
20 S. Tench et al.
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Figures (a)-(b) show KS plots for Hawkes process Model 2 in Phases 2 and
4 respectively. Data points falling on the solid goodness of fit line imply a perfect
model fit with the dashed lines representing 95% error bounds.
Figure 6. Serial correlation plot for Hawkes process Model 2 in Phase 4. A random
dispersion of data points indicates goodness of fit of the model.
line of best fit to conclude a good fit of the Hawkes process. For the model
in Phase 4 the KS test had to be conducted at the 99% level of confidence to
obtain a significant outcome. Despite this the KS plot for Phase 4, as shown
in Figure 5(b), gives some qualitative evidence for goodness of fit of the model
even at the 95% level. There also appeared to be some patterning in the serial
correlation plot for Model 2 in Phase 4 as shown in Figure 6.
4.6.2 Interpreting Parameters
Since Belfast was such a central stage in the NI conflict it is not too surprising
that the trends for the parameter values in Model 2 are similar to those seen
for Model 1. However, Model 2 in Phase 2 does not share the same significant
changes in parameter values as observed for Model 1. This implies the PIRA
attacks in Belfast were less susceptible to internal and external changes. One
explanation for this observation is the existence of a Northern Command Unit
being based in Belfast since 1969 [25]. As such it may have been easier for
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PIRA to quickly adapt to internal and external events, such as, the mass im-
prisonment of PIRA members which led to the organisation becoming cell-based
in Phase 2 [19].
4.7 Model 3
The next model considered was a multivariate Hawkes process. With this model
we aimed to capture the influence on PIRA IED attacks in Belfast based on
self-excitations of past PIRA attacks in Belfast and mutual-excitations of past
PIRA attacks in the six counties of NI.
4.7.1 Goodness of Fit
It can be seen from the results table presented earlier that the increased com-
plexity from using a multivariate Hawkes process in Model 3 does not yield a
better fitting model compared to Model 2. This may be due to the autonomy
of ASUs in the counties of NI and Belfast [25].
Nonetheless, in all but one case there is quantitative evidence for goodness
of fit of the models. For the model in Phase 5 goodness of fit was found
only after the KS test was conducted at the 99% level. The models in Phases
2, 3 and 5 did not have strong qualitative evidence for the goodness of fit
of the model as shown by KS plots in Figure 7. Nonetheless, the transformed
time data for each model appeared to be independent as measured by a serial
correlation plot.
4.7.2 Interpreting Parameters
From the parameter values presented in Table 6 more evidence is gained for
the relative autonomy of the Belfast Brigade from the other PIRA units. In
particular, it can be seen that the value of the jump from self-excitations, k0,
is much higher than that for mutual-excitations, s0. Whilst the opposite is true
for the decay rate of self-excitations, ω, and those of mutual-excitations, ν. This
suggests that the events in the six counties of NI had little impact on IED
attacks in Belfast and the impact they did have was short lived. Also it can
be seen that the self-excitation part of the model is very similar to that of the
Belfast only case in Model 2 suggesting that Model 2 is sufficient for studying
the internal dynamics of PIRA attacks in Belfast.
4.8 Model 4
In the final two models examined in this paper the focus will be on the in-
fluence of actions by BSFs in NI. These models are only examined in Phase 1
and on spatially aggregated data across NI due to a lack of data concerning
BSF attacks. The first of these models is a multivariate Hawkes process con-
sidering the influence on PIRA attacks against BSFs based on self-excitations
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Figure 7. Figures (a) - (c) show KS plots for Hawkes process Model 3 in Phases 2,
3 and 5 respectively. Data points falling on the solid goodness of fit line imply a
perfect model fit with the dashed lines representing 95% error bounds.
of past IED attacks against BSFs and mutual-excitations of past BSF attacks
which killed Catholic civilians. The decision to study the impact of the deaths
of Catholic civilians resulted from the fact that the PIRA were heavily rooted
in the Catholic community [56]. In our datasets the number of IED attacks
targeting BSFs is 144 and the number of Catholic civilian deaths resulting from
BSF events is 78.
4.8.1 Goodness of Fit
Results of applying goodness of fit tests to Model 4 are shown in Table 7.
Quantitatively Model 4 appears to provide a good fit to the IED data. Qual-
itatively, however, it should be noted that the data points in the KS plot do
not lie on the line of best fit, as can be seen in Figure 8. Nonetheless, the
serial correlation plot, although not included here, does suggest independence of
the data points.
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Figure 8. KS plot for multidimensional Hawkes process Model 4. Data points falling
on the solid goodness of fit line imply a perfect model fit with the dashed lines
representing 95% error bounds.
4.8.2 Interpreting Parameters
Interpreting the MLE parameter values for Model 4 it can be seen that BSF
attacks, which lead to the death of Catholic civilians, actually caused a backlash
in terms of leading to an increase in IED attacks. In particular, the jump
parameter, s0, is high compared to the other values seen in this paper implying
that following an incident involving the death of a Catholic civilian the PIRA
were likely to respond with a large increase in IED attacks targeting BSFs.
Also the decay rate of this increase in attacks, ν, is small suggesting a lengthy
period of increased violence equivalent to an average of 73 days. This prolonged
retaliation by PIRA may be seen as an attempt by the organisation to obtain
public legitimacy by acting as defenders of the Catholic population. Such results
also give support for the sort of findings made by Braithwaite and Johnson [7]
where less discriminatory counter-insurgency operations were found to result in
an increase in violence.
4.9 Model 5
The final model studied in this paper is similar to Model 4 except now the in-
fluence of BSF attacks which killed PIRA members is considered. In our dataset
there are 58 recorded incidents of BSF events resulting in PIRA member deaths.
4.9.1 Goodness of Fit
Goodness of fit test results are shown in Table 7. These results show that,
based on the AIC, Model 5 performs worse than Model 4 at modelling PIRA
attacks targeting BSFs. This result indicates that Catholic civilian deaths were
better predictors of a backlash by the PIRA. Moreover, the KS test is only
significant for Model 5 when considered at the 99% level. The KS plot for
Model 5, shown in Figure 9, suggests that the data points are not falling on
the line of best fit so there is not enough qualitative evidence to declare a
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Figure 9. KS plot for multidimensional Hawkes process Model 5. Data points falling
on the solid goodness of fit line imply a perfect model fit with the dashed lines
representing 95% error bounds.
significantly good fit. However, the serial correlation plot did suggest that the
data points were independent.
4.9.2 Interpreting Parameters
The parameter values for Model 5 also suggest an increase in violence against
BSFs following a BSF event leading to the death of a PIRA member. The
increase in the rate of IED attacks, given by s0, following such an operation
is high compared to other values seen in this paper and the length of time
this increase is sustained, given by ν, is quite long at an average of 115 days.
These observations may be the result of PIRA trying to revenge the death of
its members as well as demonstrating defiance. This is similar to the findings
of Lafree, Dugan and Korte [28] which suggested an increase in PIRA attacks
following BSF operations which killed PIRA members. When planning CT strate-
gies these observations, and similar ones for Model 4, imply that after a civilian
or terrorist death quick interventions are necessary to avoid long time periods
of increased violence.
5 Discussion
We began this paper by outlining the importance of mathematical modelling in
terrorism and stressing in particular the contributions such modelling could make
to improving CT responses. From a firm foundation of criminological theory con-
cerning spatio-temporal patterns of crime and a mathematical model known as a
Hawkes process we then proceeded to model IED attacks during the NI conflict.
The first step taken in this paper was to divide the IED dataset we used into
five phases corresponding to organisational changes within the PIRA as described
by Asal et al. [3]. Although this allowed for a greater depth of analysis it did
introduce the issue of edge effects where events in one phase influence those
in the next phase. To account for this a novel approach was found using a
25
moving time frame to incorporate events from the previous phase where an
improvement was then judged using the KS test. It was found that in Phases
2 and 3 very few data points were needed to achieve the best fitting model.
However in Phases 4 and 5 more significant edge effects were found. For each
phase new mathematical boundaries were fixed for the analyses in this paper.
Such findings raise interesting questions relating to the timing of tactical and
organisational shifts within the PIRA that may have previously been missed.
Having defined the phase boundaries of PIRA we then moved to analyse six
models aimed at capturing different temporal patterns of IED usage by the
organisation at different geographical scales.
Initially in Model 1 we examined the self-exciting nature of IED attacks across
the whole of NI. For this case it was found that the model outperforms a
simple Poisson process, defined by Model 0, as measured by the AIC. Moreover,
quantitative and qualitative evidence suggested that this model was capturing
the temporal patterns of IED attacks. With the model specified we were then
able to compare its predictions to historical accounts of the PIRA illustrating
how such models could be used in practise to determine how terrorist groups
respond to past events.
Being the center of much of the violence seen during “The Troubles” [20] we
then decided to refine the geographical scale to focus on Belfast. Here it was
found that there was quantitative and qualitative evidence to suggest the model
is good at capturing past influences on further IED attacks. In addition, a
study of the model parameters revealed a similar pattern to Model 1 although
with some difference in Phase 2. But again using historical accounts of the
PIRA we were able to account for this difference. This shows that by adjusting
the spatial scale it is possible to gain more refined information about a terrorist
organisation demonstrating the depth of insights that can be gained from Hawkes
process models.
Having studied univariate models the next model considered was a multidi-
mensional model which aimed to examine the interplay between IED attacks
in Belfast and those in the six counties of NI. It was found that the ad-
ditional complexity did not yield significant improvements over the self-exciting
model in Belfast only. However, it was found that this could be accounted for
by examining the autonomous nature of Active Service Units of the PIRA in
the counties of NI and Belfast. Hence this gives an example of how Hawkes
processes can also be used to uncover simultaneous influences on different com-
ponents of terrorist organisations over a range of spatial scales. Quantitative and
some qualitative evidence also exists confirming these models are capturing some
of the IED dynamics studied.
For the final two models our focus was on determining the effectiveness of
multidimensional Hawkes processes for testing CT strategies. The first of these
models was used to investigate how BSF attacks which lead to the death of
Catholic civilians influenced PIRA attacks. On the other hand the second model
examined the influence of BSF attacks leading to PIRA member deaths. The
former model proved to be a better fit for the IED data both in terms of a
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direct comparison using the AIC and using quantitative and qualitative goodness
of fit tests. Although with small datasets for this investigation some care should
be taken when drawing conclusions from these models. Despite this the param-
eter values for both models were consistent with previous research showing the
retaliatory nature of terrorist groups. This indicates that important lessons can
be learned from Hawkes processes concerning how terrorist groups will respond
to different events.
In conclusion, it is hoped that this paper has shown the adaptability of
Hawkes process models to study a range of areas within CT. For future re-
search it is planned to extend these models further using an explicit spatial
component as opposed to the implicit approach taken here. This should allow
further details concerning the patterning of PIRAs attacks to be uncovered and
also enable more depth to be gained concerning hotspots of terrorism during
the NI conflict. It would also be interesting to take a sociological point of view
on the results found here and in particular examine again the changes that
occurred in the PIRA to align theory with the mathematical phase boundaries
that we have found.
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